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11. INTRODUCTION
Gift exchange markets, in the Akerlof (1982) sense, have been employed as experimental
representations of labor markets with variable effort and of goods markets with variable quality.
Issues related to cooperative behavior play a prominent role in this form of market.  The
experimental analysis of these situations, first studied by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), has
shown that behavior usually deviates substantially from simple own-payoff maximization. Yet
some of the motivational underpinnings of the remarkable behavior observed in these experiments
are still quite unclear.  In particular, there has been no previous study on whether and how gift
exchange is affected by the direction of the competitive pressures that are present in a market
environment.  Similarly, there is no evidence on whether gift-exchange is affected by the existence
of a minimum wage, an institution that is present in most market economies. Our aim in this
paper is to study the effects of these features of market conditions on the patterns of gift
exchange.  
One can describe the basic sequence of events in a typical experimental gift-exchange
market in the following manner: There are two types of agents (firms and workers) participating
in the market, and the number of firms may or may not be equal to the number of workers.  First,
firms make wage offers - gifts - in a one-sided auction and workers have the opportunity of
accepting them; in the standard case, workers cannot make counter-offers.1  After a worker has
accepted a firm’s offer, the two parties become matched and the wage cannot be changed.  A firm
can only be matched with one worker and vice versa.  Workers then choose effort levels and are
free to select any of the feasible levels, including one with zero cost.  They decide the extent to
2which they return possible gifts.  Holding effort constant, higher wages yield lower monetary
payoffs for firms and higher ones for workers; higher effort levels have the reverse effect on
payoffs, holding wages constant.
The standard game-theoretic prediction is that workers will invariably choose the lowest
possible effort level, since this choice is dominant in a pecuniary sense; in anticipation of this,
firms will only make the lowest possible wage offer.  However, numerous studies of this game,
for example Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997), Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998) and
Hannan, Kagel and Moser (2002), have established a highly significant positive relationship
between the wage assigned and the effort level chosen.  The investment game of Berg, Dickhaut &
McCabe (1995) is a related sequential two-player game, in which the first-mover’s pass is tripled
and the responder’s pass is not augmented.  Ninety-two percent of all senders sent a positive
amount of money, and 80% of all responders who were sent money returned a positive amount.2
Another related sequential prisoner’s dilemma study is Clark and Sefton (2001).   Here they use a
series of 2x2 games.  Responders choose to cooperate much more frequently after first-mover
cooperation than after first-mover non-cooperation.
Results from experimental gift-exchange and related games have been very influential in
establishing the relevance of social preferences in economic environments.  However, to date
there is no clear agreement on the precise motivational forces behind the observed behavior.  In
particular, it remains to be established how gift-exchange is affected by the degree to which it is
embedded in a market environment.  Perhaps a worker makes a costly effort choice because of his
                                                                                                                                                            
1 Fehr and Falk (1999) study the case where workers can make counter-offers.
2 These figures combine the “no history” and “social history” treatments.
3perception of the kindness of the wage offer.  In this case, changes in market conditions may lead
to changes in wage offers and in the way that workers view a given wage.  Alternatively, pure
outcome-based models (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) have argued
that costly effort provision is not a response to kindness, but instead it is a form of generosity
that reflects concerns about the distribution of payoffs.  To the extent that costly effort stems
from purely distributive motivations, choices should not depend on market conditions.
We first study how behavior is affected by the state of competition, by which we mean
the relationship between the number of firms and the number of workers.  In experimental gift
exchange markets there may be more workers than firms or the other way around, and this
relation determines whether labor is in excess supply or excess demand.  We are interested in the
psychological, not in the strategic, impact of varying the direction of the competitive pressure.
We believe that the psychology of competition is an important socio-economic issue.  If the state
of competition were to have a significant effect on behavior, due to some form of interdependence
of motivations, this would affect the very basis of how economists think about markets, since it
would imply that a specific feature of the economic environment interacts with people’s
preferences in these markets.
We also examine the effect of imposing a minimum wage on the behavior of firms and
workers.  A minimum-wage requirement is a prominent feature in contemporary labor markets,
and so the effect of a minimum wage on behavior and productivity is an issue of considerable
economic importance.  At the same time, looking at its impact may help identify the precise
motivation for gift-exchange.  If the existence of a minimum wage were to affect gift-exchange at
all, that would be another instance of interaction between preferences and environment; if, in
4addition, the minimum wage led to lower gift-exchange and income levels, this would be a new
type of negative effect of this labor market restriction, beyond the negative employment effect
associated with more standard analysis.
The unifying feature for both of these issues is the question of whether worker behavior
is sensitive not only to the wage offer, but also to the ‘background’ or the circumstances
surrounding the situations in which gift exchange takes place.  For example, if there are more
workers than jobs, one might not need to offer as high a wage as when there are more jobs than
workers.  Thus, a certain wage might appear to be more generous when the competitive balance
favors the firms, since workers may attribute the wage to competitive pressures.  Similarly, if we
impose a minimum wage in a market where the firms hold the power, we might expect that a
particular wage offer may seem less generous, since it is plausibly evaluated in relation to the
lowest possible one.
The focus of our study is very much related to the more general theme that preferences
depend not only on the outcomes that follow from certain choices, but also on information
concerning the process leading to these outcomes.  Information pertaining to the process – and
not to the outcome - may matter because it offers inferences about the intentions or disposition
behind the actions of others.  The state of competition and the presence of a minimum wage are,
in our view, quite relevant to the process by which market allocations are determined.  
We believe that our paper contributes to the identification of the precise determinants of
behavior in gift-exchange games.  To make progress in this direction, it is necessary to rigorously
study gift-exchange behavior from a variety of different angles.  Note that it would be difficult to
carry out this kind of analysis on the basis of field data alone, since in natural environments it
5would be unusual to find data with the desired variations in the non-outcome information.  In
contrast, experiments make it possible to generate this kind of evidence in a systematic manner.
Our results suggest, perhaps surprisingly, that gift-exchange behavior is not greatly
affected by certain changes in market conditions.  We do not find major differences in
responsiveness to wages in our comparisons, although we do find some modest effects across
some of the treatments.  In particular, an imposed minimum wage seems to lower effort provision
at all wages, and also decreases the likelihood that a high wage is paid.  In our final section we
present a discussion of the manner in which our results mesh with other findings concerning the
effects of non-outcome information on choice.
2. BACKGROUND
Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara & Zamir (1991) demonstrate that results are very
different for an ultimatum game with one-to-one matching and a “market game” in which a single
agent on one side can agree to a proposal from any of nine agents on the other side.  This kind of
difference in behavior can easily be explained in terms of purely distributional preferences (see
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Our first focus is on the more emotional links between market
imbalance and behavior.  
In our markets, contracts can be considered to be incomplete, in the sense that workers
make their choices after wages have been fixed and there is no monitoring or sanctioning of any
kind.3  In previous gift-exchange experiments the number of workers was about 1/3 to 1/2 higher
                                                
3 Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2002) find that contractual incompleteness “causes fundamental changes in the nature of
market interactions” in a repeated-interaction environment.  When there are excess workers and complete contracts
6than the number of firms; no previous study has considered the case whether there are more jobs
than there are workers.  However, in times of economic boom or when a task is highly
specialized, such conditions are not uncommon; Silicon Valley experienced a chronic shortage of
high-tech workers in the late 1990’s.  In such a context, we conjecture that workers may perceive
a higher wage to be inspired by ‘pure gift-giving’ (when there is an excess of workers) or ‘gift-
giving under competitive pressures’ (when there is an excess of firms).  
Bowles (1998) presents a detailed survey of the literature on the different ways in which
institutions may affect values, tastes and personalities.  One of the several issues he discusses is
closely related to the effect of market imbalance on the motivation of market participants.  He
states: “...or to take another example, there are significant differences in the personality effects on
participants in markets which clear in equilibrium and those which do not, and in those markets
which do not clear, for people on the short side of the market (whose advantageous positions
may allow them to make take it or leave it offers) and those on the long side of the market, some
of whom are simply excluded from the exchange process, while others fear losing the transactions
they have secured.”4
Minimum wages, our second focus, were instituted in part as a response to the
‘sweatshop’ abuses of the 19th century and earlier.  The essential idea relates to equitable income
distribution, in principle enabling even the poorest classes to earn a ‘decent’ living.  The effect of
a minimum wage on employment has been the subject of numerous studies based on field data.
                                                                                                                                                            
(external enforcement of effort), firms hold workers to little more than their reservation payoffs; in contrast, workers
earn generous rents in a market with incomplete contracts and an excess supply of workers.
4 For a more general discussion of the effects of participation in markets on preferences see also Lane (1991).
7Card and Krueger (1995) contains an overview of this research, which deals with whether the
minimum wage has a positive or negative effect on employment.
The effect of a minimum wage on market behavior and productivity has not been directly
studied in the laboratory in a context of incomplete contracts and market competition.  To the
best of our knowledge, Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2002) is the only other experimental study that
specifically considers minimum wages in labor markets.  They find that having a minimum wage
that is higher than the usual wage paid leads to more employment, in that workers are less likely
to reject higher wages.  However, their study is quite different since it does not consider the case
of discretionary effort for an employed worker. In addition, since only one wage offer is made
known to each worker in each period, this design does not feature public market interaction.   
Information about market conditions may be useful for inferring the intentions of others,
as it pertains to the opportunities that others have in the market.  In a review of the connections
between psychology and economics, Rabin (1998) discusses the relationship between
opportunities and the attribution of intentions.  He states that: “When motivated by reciprocal
altruism, for instance, people differentiate between those who take a generous action by choice
and those who are forced to do so.”  Whether people are ‘forced to be generous’ may depend on
the situation in which they find themselves.5  In particular, a minimum-wage régime may be seen
as forcing employers to be generous beyond what they otherwise would be.
                                                
5 Charness (forthcoming) considers the effect of attribution for a wage in a gift-exchange labor market, comparing
responses to firm-determined wages to responses to wages determined either by a draw from a bingo cage or by a
third party.  While the attribution of volition has a significant effect on behavior when wages are relatively low,
effort choices do not vary across treatments at high wages.  Blount (1995) and Offerman (2002) also study
attribution (in non-gift-exchange games) and find evidence that the process leading to the available alternatives
affects responder behavior
8Sen (1997) provides a general discussion of the influence that the act of choice may have
on behavior and suggests that relevant factors can be classified as either chooser dependence or
menu dependence.6  Differences in characteristics of decision-makers reflect chooser dependence,
while the possible impact of foregone opportunities (or of social information) relates to menu
dependence.  For example, studies of the effect of causal attribution on behavior concern chooser
dependence, while studies of the effect of foregone opportunities (alternative courses of action
that other players could have taken but didn’t) concern menu dependence.  In the latter category,
Brandts and Solà (2001), Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (forthcoming), and Charness and Rabin
(2002) find definite evidence that the likelihood of an offer being rejected is affected by the
options that were not exercised.7  
In a broad sense, our study pertains to Sen’s menu dependence – a worker may judge a
given wage offer in relation to a firm’s set of options.  However, it also speaks to the predictions
of formal models of interdependent preferences. These all predict a positive relation between
wages and effort levels, although for different reasons. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) propose models in which individual motivation is increasing in one’s financial
reward and decreasing in disparities among payoffs, but does not depend on other circumstances.
In contrast, Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (forthcoming) present models of
kindness-based reciprocity, in which beliefs about the kindness of another player’s action can
                                                
6 Sen’s classification is a useful organizing tool, although it may not easily cover all ways in which non-outcome
information may affect behavior.
7 On the other hand, Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (2001) present some results from simple sequential dilemma
games and find that foregone opportunities do not affect behavior significantly.
9affect behavior.  A higher wage induces a greater effort response due to positive reciprocity for
the firm’s perceived intentional kindness.8  
These classes of models differ in their predictions concerning the effect of the market-
condition changes we study.  The purely outcome-based models predict higher effort for higher
wages, due to the larger interim payoff disparity between the firm and the worker when a higher
wage is offered.  However, they also predict that the patterns of behavior will not differ across
our treatments.  In contrast, the kindness-based reciprocity models as formulated predict a
definite difference in behavior when a minimum wage is introduced, and a plausible difference as
well according to the state of competition.  
One such model, developed for sequential games such as ours, is that of Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (forthcoming).  As in the Rabin (1993) model, the degree of perceived kindness of an
action is determined with respect to a range of feasible choices.  Intuitively, imposing a minimum
wage shrinks this range, so that wage offers close to the minimum wage are less kind than the
same wage offers when the feasible range includes the lowest wages.  On the other hand, the
highest wage in any non-degenerate range is always considered completely kind in this model.
With respect to imbalanced markets, if workers feel that competitive pressures cause
firms to increase wages when there are more jobs than workers, the lowest ‘feasible’ wage would
be higher, shrinking the suitable or applicable wage range.  Since an intermediate wage would then
                                                
8 The Charness and Rabin (2002) model does not consider kindness or positive reciprocity.  One is instead
motivated to some degree by the desire to do what is “socially appropriate’ – to sacrifice money to promote the
aggregate social utility, taking into account the total payoff and the lowest payoff for anyone in the group.  This
model predicts lower effort for lower wages, as each worker withdraws his (heterogeneous) concern (and thus his
willingness to sacrifice) for a firm that offers less than the ‘socially-appropriate’ wage.  However, there is no
obvious manner in which the presumably fairly high (for social-efficiency reasons) appropriate wage will differ
across treatments, so that no difference in behavior is predicted across treatments.  
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be considered less kind when the supply of labor is scarce (with top wages equally kind in either
case), this would lead to the same qualitative prediction as with a minimum wage.9  
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, PROCEDURES & HYPOTHESES
 We conducted a total of 16 experimental sessions in Barcelona, involving a total of 306
participants.  We used a multi-period design in 12 of these sessions, as is standard in
experimental gift-exchange games, with 10 periods in each session; in the other four sessions we
studied one-shot gift exchange games.  
 In our context, the repetition of the situation may have the effect of increasing the salience
of the market conditions, and so may increase the chance of a treatment effect. However,
repetition may also lead to reputation effects.  In our experimental procedures interaction took
place under anonymity, so that no identification of the other person in a match is possible.  In
this sense, each interaction should be considered to be a separate event.  However, a worker
knows that she might be anonymously re-matched with the same firm, so that dynamic
considerations may be relevant.  In addition, perhaps the number of participants is small enough
to attempt to maintain a group reputation.  
 Our focus in this study is on the existence of treatment effects from varying market
conditions.  Any such effect should not be influenced by the possible presence of reputation, i.e.
a priori there is no reason to believe that market conditions will interact with reputation
formation.  Nevertheless, to verify that gift exchange itself is not entirely an artifact of repeated
                                                
9 We thank Martin Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger for their clarifying comments in this regard.
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interaction we also conducted four sessions with pure one-shot gift exchange (no multiple
periods).
 Our 12 multi-period sessions consisted of four sessions of each of three treatments.  In
the excess supply of labor (hereafter, ESL) treatment, there were 12 workers and eight firms.  In
the excess supply of firms (hereafter, ESF) treatment, there were eight workers and 12 firms.
Comparisons across these treatments corresponded to our investigation of the effects of market
imbalance.  In the minimum-wage (hereafter MW) treatment, we imposed a minimum wage when
there were more workers than firms, the ESL case. 
 
 3.1 Design.  In our multi-period sessions, we use the following simple symmetric and linear
payoff functions:
 FI = 10 – w + 5e              (1)
 WI = 10 – e + 5w,            (2)
where FI and WI refer (respectively) to firm income and worker income, w denotes the wage and
e the effort level.  The range of possible wage and effort levels is restricted to integers between 0
and 10, inclusive.  Each unit of income was worth five pesetas ($1@ 150 pesetas, at that time).
When there was no minimum-wage requirement, a firm was free to propose any wage from zero
up to the endowment of 10.  When we imposed a minimum wage, wage offers could range from
five – the mid-point of the original range - to 10.  A worker or a firm who remained unmatched in
any period (due to the excess supply of labor or firms, respectively) retained his or her
endowment of 10 for that period.  
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The symmetry and the linearity of the payoff structure are the two crucial features of our
design.  The symmetry of the payoff functions is necessary to ensure that the impact of our
treatment variables can be studied in isolation.10  It implies that, apart from issues of market
conditions, the only difference between the incentives of the two players is caused by the fact
that one of them chooses first and the other chooses second.  It also makes it possible to think of
a situation with n firms and m workers as symmetric to the case of m firms and n workers.11
Similarly, the symmetry makes it transparent how the minimum wage restricts firms’
opportunities. Finally, given symmetry, equality of wage and effort yields a simple benchmark
for evaluating the degree to which the second movers take a larger share for themselves.  
 The linearity of our payoff function simplifies the decision situation by making the
marginal effect of effort independent of the wage.  It will also facilitate the formulation of our null
hypothesis below.  Another important feature of our design is that the information available to
participants was the same in all three treatments.  All wage offers were public information both
for firms and for workers, while only the parties directly involved knew the effort supplied in a
particular match.12
 It is easy to verify that with these features the standard subgame-perfect equilibrium
prediction does not depend on whether there are more firms or more workers in the market, or on
                                                
10 An asymmetric representation could be easily introduced in subsequent experiments.
11 Here the wage is not a pure one-to-one transfer, unlike the payoff design in Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993)
and its successors.  For our purposes, however, the crucial feature of the gift exchange game, from a conceptual
point of view, is the sequential structure of the game and the fact that joint deviations can lead to common gains.
Since we wished to maintain these two features and, at the same time, introduce symmetry, it was not possible to
keep the one-to-one transfer aspect of the payoff structure.  One can think of our design as representing the case
where gifts are more valuable to the recipient than to the donor.
12 An antecedent of our analysis of the state of competition is Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter (1998).  They
compare behavior in gift exchange markets with excess supply to behavior in a bilateral gift exchange condition.
However, they use an asymmetric non-linear payoff function in both treatments and information about others’ wage
offers is different across the two treatments.  Given these features, their data can not be used for our purposes.
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whether firms’ choice set allows for more or less possibilities.   In the second stage workers have
no financial incentive to exert any effort.  Given this expected behavior, the subgame-perfect
equilibrium notion predicts that firms will offer a wage of zero (or five, with the minimum wage).
As a consequence, without a minimum wage, all agents would receive payoffs of 10,
independently of the existence and type of market imbalance.  When firms are required to offer a
wage of at least five, the standard model predicts that firms each receive five, matched workers
each receive 35, and unmatched workers each receive 10, the endowment.  
 In our four sessions with one-shot encounters, we used the payoff functions:
 FI = 800 – 20w + 100e              (1’)
 WI = 800 – 20e + 100w,            (2’)
 with 1 unit = 1 peseta.  To generate suitable final earnings for participants in a one-shot
experiment the parameter values are different than those in (1) and (2).  Observe, however, that
the transformation rate between wage and effort is equal to 5, just as in the previous payoff
functions.  The only difference is the size of the constant term; linearity and symmetry are
preserved.
 
 3.2 Procedures.  The multi-period sessions took about two hours.  At the beginning of each
experimental session, all participants were gathered in one room and the instructions were read to
them, while they read along.13  During this time subjects could ask public questions about the
procedures. The participants were then randomly assigned to one of the roles, and workers and
                                                
13 A copy of the instructions can be found at the Economic Journal website.  With the exception of the payoff
function they closely follow those of Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993).
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firms were seated in different rooms.  Each period consisted of two stages: Stage 1 of each period
consisted in a one-sided oral auction.  Employers made wage offers and these offers were written
on the blackboards of both rooms.  In the ESL and ESF treatments, firms that had not made a
wage offer received a payoff of 10; this gave them the same payoff than if they had made a wage
offer of 0 and had then been matched with a worker who chose a 0 effort level. In the MW
treatment firms were obligated to make an offer; if they offered the minimum wage of 5 they
ensured themselves a payoff of 5.
 To accept an offer a worker had to raise his hand and state which of the outstanding
offers he accepted.  In Stage 2, each worker wrote his effort level on his record sheet.  This
information was then communicated exclusively to the corresponding firm.  We excluded the
possibility of workers rejecting wage offers.  Our trading rules specified that, after the wage-offer
stage of a period was over, workers who had not accepted a wage would be randomly assigned to
the firms whose offers were still outstanding; it was actually never necessary in our sessions to
assign subjects randomly according to this rule.
 Payoffs in each of the 10 periods were aggregated to yield session payoffs.  Subjects were
paid privately at the end of the session; in addition to experimental earnings, each participant
received 500 pesetas as a show-up fee.  Average total earnings were about 2000 pesetas.  
 For the four single-period sessions, each session had an even number of participants (18,
18, 14 and 16), with half randomly assigned the role of first movers (firms) and the other half
assigned the role of second movers (workers).14  As in the multiple-period sessions, subjects
                                                
14 These sessions did not involve any market interaction, since they were specifically thought of as controls for the
dynamic aspects of the other sessions.
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were gathered in a room and the instructions were read to them while they read along.  The single
period developed as follows: First, each first mover decided separately on a wage offer.  Each
offer was then communicated to a randomly selected second mover, who then made an effort
decision.  After that the session was over; subjects were privately paid their earnings and left the
room. The average payment in these half-hour sessions was approximately 1100 pesetas.
 3.3 Hypotheses. Once a wage has been accepted, a worker maximizes his own period earnings by
contributing no effort.  Anticipating this, a firm should choose the lowest possible wage – 0 in
ESL and ESF and 5 in MW.  Thus, according to the most standard view of economic behavior,
both wages and effort levels will invariably be the minimum permitted. Embedding a game of this
type in a market environment with competition does not alter the straightforward prediction of
game-theoretic analysis.  In an unbalanced market context some agents will not be matched, but
this does not affect the pecuniary incentive structure of subjects given that they have been
matched.  This prediction represents the strong null hypothesis; however, to take into account
the possibility of decision error we formulate a somewhat weaker null hypothesis.
 Decision error can be conceptualized by presuming that subjects just make purely random
mistakes in their decisions; alternatively, Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) posit that relatively
costly mistakes are less likely.  Note, however, that costs of deviations do not depend on the
actions of others, given the linear structure of our payoff function; in addition, deviation costs are
the same in all treatments. Thus, incorporating the notion of errors into the standard prediction
leads to the following null hypothesis, composed of three elements:   
H0:
16
        (i) Wage offers are the same under ESF than under ESL and lower than under MW.15
        (ii) Effort levels are independent of wage levels in all treatments.
        (iii) The relationship between wages and effort is the same in all treatments.
We now move to our alternative hypotheses.  The anticipation of firms’ wage offers is
somewhat more complex than that of workers as it may involve both strategic and motivational
elements.  For example, one might expect that in a tighter labor market (ESF) the additional
competitive pressure could lead to higher wages than in one with slack. On the other hand, if
firms anticipate that workers would return a gift more generously under ESL, this might lead to
higher wages under ESL than under ESF.  Regarding the MW treatment, at first glance the wage
restriction would appear to necessarily raise the average wage, but there may be countervailing
forces.  While the overall effect is not completely clear for either comparison, we feel that it is
natural that the primary effect will dominate and formulate a one-sided alternative to portion (i)
of the null hypothesis:
HAi: Wage offers in the ESL treatment will be lower than in the non-ESL treatments.
Current models of interdependent preferences predict that higher wages will lead to higher
effort levels in all treatments, as is the case in all previous gift-exchange experiments.  In line with
all of these models, we formulate the alternative to portion (ii) of our null hypothesis:
HAii: Effort levels are increasing in wage levels in all treatments.
We conjectured earlier that there could be differences when comparing the ESL to either
the ESF or the MW treatments. While menu dependence may stem from motives not captured by
                                                
15 This assumes that errors are not so pervasive as to cause the prevailing wage under ESF and ESL to exceed five.
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the more formal models, the kindness-based models posit that the kindness of a wage offer
reflects the range from which it was chosen.  The ranges differ explicitly between the MW and
ESL treatments, leading to one alternative to part (iii) of our null hypothesis:
HAiii(MW): Worker responsiveness for wages will differ less across the range of
intermediate and high wages in the MW treatment than in the ESL treatment
.
With respect to the ESL-ESF comparison, if a worker felt that an intermediate wage was
‘forced’ by the competitive pressures in ESF, this wage would be perceived to be less kind than
in the ESL treatment.  Thus, a moderate wage in ESL may be considered kinder than the same
wage in ESF or MW, while these models predict that a wage at the top of the range (10) is
equally kind in all cases.  So, worker responsiveness to wages could plausibly differ across
treatments at moderate wages, but (according to the model) not at top wages, leading to the
following alternative to part (iii) of the null hypothesis:
HAiii(ESF): Worker responsiveness for wages will differ less across the range of
intermediate and high wages in the ESF  treatment than in the ESL treatment.
 
 For the sake of precision, we have chosen to formulate the last alternative hypothesis in
terms of the relevant kindness-based models.  However, as already mentioned, menu-dependence
may take other forms than the one predicted by theory.  In addition, the range-based notion of
kindness may miss important aspects of the broader notion of kindness.  Even though we have
chosen these specific hypotheses, we are open to other comparisons of differences in behavior
across treatments.
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4. RESULTS
The ESL, ESF, and MW results are displayed graphically in Figures I, II, and III, where
the variable called wage refers to accepted wages.
[Figures I, II, and III about here]
The patterns are similar in the ESL and ESF treatments; in both cases the modal outcome
is the firm offering a wage of 10 and the worker choosing an effort level of 10.  However,
imposing a minimum wage of 5 has the effect of dramatically reducing the number of times that a
wage of 10 is chosen.  The height of the (0,0) column in ESF is much smaller than in ESL, as few
0 wage proposals were accepted.  Note the almost total lack of points to the southeast.  In fact,
there were only five occasions (three in ESL, one in ESF, and one in MW) where effort exceeded
the wage.  While there is a slight “ridge of reciprocation” along the 45-degree line, people very
rarely respond to a “gift” with a larger “gift”, even though this would increase the total payoff.
However, there are many observations with 0 effort, even when the wage is 10.  This asymmetry
leads to the workers earning, on average, substantially more than the firms do.16  
Figure IV shows the average wage in our treatments over time, with separate series for
offered wages and accepted wages in ESF; Figure V shows the average effort chosen over time.
 [Figures IV and V about here]
We see that wages are generally fairly high, except that there appears to be a substantial
drop in wages in the last period of the ESF and ESL treatments.  As already mentioned, effort
levels are substantially lower than wages, despite the symmetry of the payoff structure. The
                                                
16 This is a familiar phenomenon in dilemma games of this nature.  This fact may be surprising at first sight, but it
is actually very much in line with social-preference models such as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and
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differences between the three wage series appear to be quite small throughout the periods with
accepted wages in ESF being slightly higher.  While there is a spread in average effort in early
periods, this diminishes over time.  Average effort drops off in later periods, particularly in the
ESF and ESL treatments.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the average effort at each wage, along with the overall average (accepted)
wage and the overall average effort in each of these treatments:
[Table 1 about here]
The average accepted wage offer in the ESF treatment was 8.36, 12% higher than the 7.45
average wage in the ESL treatment.  However, considering all wages offered in ESF (recall that 1/3
of the offers in ESF are left unmatched), the average is 7.35.  By comparison, the average wage in
the MW treatment is only slightly higher, at 7.82, even though we preclude low wages.  If we
exclude wages lower than 5, the average wage in the ESL treatment is 8.76 and the average
accepted wage in the ESF treatment is 9.02.
Effort levels are a bit lower in ESL than in ESF, consistent with the slightly lower wages
in ESL; the ratio of aggregate effort to aggregate wage is .527 for ESF and .516 for ESL.17  On the
other hand, effort appears to be substantially lower when there is a minimum wage, and the
effort/wage ratio is only .345.   
                                                                                                                                                            
Schmidt (1999), and Charness and Rabin (2002).  According to these models, second movers will tend to make
choices that give themselves more than half.
17 We also computed separate ratios for wages from 5-10, inclusive.  There was virtually no difference for either
ESF or ESL (.527 vs. .529 and .516 vs. .523, respectively).
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We can also distinguish among the treatments in terms of efficiency or in terms of
cooperative gains. By efficiency, we refer to the proportion of maximum joint payoff that is
achieved; cooperative gains are defined by both sides being better off after the interaction than
before.  Efficiency is highest (63.8%) for the ESF treatment, lower (56.5%) for the ESL
treatment, and lowest (52.6%) for the MW treatment.  Cooperative gains are the rule with
relatively high wages, although workers typically obtain a considerably larger share.  The
proportion of accepted wage offers that leads to cooperative gains is fairly similar across
treatments: 55.3% for ESF, 53.4% for ESL, and 51.6% for MW.  
While we observe substantially positive effort levels in all of the ESF, ESL, and MW
sessions, the question remains whether effort would drop to zero in a one-shot interaction.  Table
2a shows the average wage and average effort level for each of our single-period sessions, while
Table 2b shows the distribution of wage offers in those sessions.
[Tables 2a and 2b about here]
We see that the average effort level is 2.42, substantially lower than the ESL and ESF
levels (3.85 and 4.41, respectively), but still somewhat higher than both the final round ESL and
ESF values.  However, the average wage offer is also lower in the single-period sessions; the
average effort is 50.0% of the average wage, not much different than the 51.6% and 52.7% ratios
in the ESL and ESF sessions, respectively, and actually greater than the 34.5% in the MW
sessions.  Average gift exchange is still sizable; the sum of first and second movers’ average
contributions (6.27) is more than 30% of the maximum feasible level (20).
As with the ESL and ESF treatments, 0 and 10 are the most frequent wage levels and
there is some additional bunching for intermediate wage levels.  The average wage is 4.84, lower
21
than the average wage in the ESL and ESF treatments, but in line with the final-round wage offers
in these treatments.18
Statistical analysis
The statistical analysis of data from gift-exchange experiments with repeated interaction
like the ones we conducted is a delicate matter.  Due to the interaction between subjects across
periods we only have, in the strict sense, one statistically-independent observation per session.
Our analysis primarily consists of nonparametric tests performed on these data points and
random-effects ordered-probit regressions, which take into account multiple observations.  We
present these alternative test results below.
Nonparametric tests  
Table 3 presents session-level data on average wages and effort in our multi-period
sessions.  In the first three rows, we consider average effort in low, medium, and high wage
ranges.  The last three rows give average wages and average effort, as well as the effort/wage ratio.
[Table 3 about here]
Wages and effort levels appear to be positively related.  To provide some statistical
validity for this reciprocity in actions we used the Page test on the basis of the ESF and ESL
session level data.  For each session we computed the mean effort level for four wage ranges: 0 to
4, 5 to 8, 9 and 10.19  For these two treatments, we can reject the null hypothesis of no relation
                                                
18 Of course, this average of 4.84 is inevitably lower than in the MW = 5 case.
19 At the session level we do not always have observations for each wage level.  For this reason, we group the data
into wage ranges. For a reference to the Page test see Siegel and Castellan (1988). It tests the hypothesis that k
matched groups are the same versus the alternative hypothesis that the groups are ordered in a specific sequence.
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between wage and effort levels in favor of the alternative of an increasing relation at the 1% level;
for the MW treatment a simple binomial test yields the same conclusion.
Table 4 shows the results of permutation tests, on wages, effort levels and effort/wage
ratios, using session-level data, across pairs of treatments.20
[Table 4 about here]
 For wages, no comparison of session-level averages shows a difference close to
conventional levels.  We also examine the statistical significance of the disparity between the
frequency of offers at the lowest and highest wage.  Using the permutation test across the ESF
and ESL treatments, we do not find significant differences in the proportions of wages equal to
zero or in the proportion of wages equal to ten.  However, the permutation test on session-level
data indicates that the proportion of wages equal to ten is lower (p = 0.057, one-tailed test) when
there is a minimum wage.21   In summary, the actions of the first-movers of our experimental
markets do not appear to be highly sensitive to whether there is excess supply or excess demand,
but the imposition of a minimum wage decreases the proportion of top wages paid.
With respect to average effort levels in each session, while we observe generally lower
effort levels in ESL than in ESF, the permutation test does not find any significant differences
between treatments. The permutation test does not reject the hypothesis that average effort
levels in the MW treatment are the same than in ESL at conventional statistical levels; however,
the probability with these few observations is on the verge of being marginally significant.  
                                                
20 In contrast to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, the permutation test also takes into account the differences between the
data for the two treatments. For a discussion of the use of the permutation test in experimental economics see Davis
and Holt (1993).
21 Interestingly, while the median wage offer was 9 under both ESL and ESF (and the median accepted wage under
ESF was 10), imposing a minimum wage lowers the median wage offer to 8.  
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Where we do find a clear treatment effect is for the comparison of effort/wage ratios.
While there is little or no difference between the effort/wage ratio in ESL and ESF, the test shows
a significant difference between this ratio in the ESL and MW treatments. Thus, the minimum
wage seems to make workers less responsive to wages in general.
Regression Analysis  
While nonparametric tests are very clean, they may lack some of the power of the more
conventional regression-analysis approach.  We use a random-effects ordered probit model to
accommodate our discrete data and multiple observations.   Although this is based on a number
of assumptions about the covariance structure, some of which may not be fully satisfied for our
data, it provides a good tool to explore the apparent difference between treatments in the rate at
which effort levels increase with wage levels.  
Tables 5a and 5b present the results of these regressions, which all include period
dummies (period 6, an arbitrary middle period, is the baseline) and treatment dummies.  Observe
that for the regressions where effort is the dependent variable we present separate specifications
with wages only between 5 and 10.  These specifications highlight the change in responsiveness
to intermediate and high wages, the range where the kindness-based models may have some
bite.22  In addition, this specification provides a meaningful test of the intercept terms in the
regressions.
[Tables 5a and 5b about here]
                                                
22 Since only wages between 5 and 10 are feasible in the MW treatment, it seems appropriate to compare effort
responses to ESL wages in the same range.
24
Consistent with the impressions one gets from the inspection of Figures IV and V, there
are some significant period effects.  For regressions in which effort is the dependent variable,
there is always a significantly negative coefficient for the period-10 dummy, and the period-9
dummy is always negative and usually significant.  Wages appear to build over the first few
periods, until they decline again in the tenth period.
In the ESL vs. ESF comparison, there is a modest (but not significant) difference across
treatments in the average accepted wage.  With respect to effort, specification (4) shows that
there does exist a significant overall treatment difference.  However, specifications (2) and (3)
reveal that this is due to the strong reaction of effort to wages.  The latter specifications show a
strong relationship between the wage accepted and the effort level chosen, whereas neither the
pure treatment dummy, nor the difference in the relationship between effort and wage are
significant across treatments.
In the ESL vs. MW comparison, shown in Table 5b, there is no significant difference in
wages across treatment when we consider all wages.  However, if we consider only wages of at
least five, the average wage is significantly higher in the ESL treatment.  Once again, we see the
strong relationship between the wage accepted and the effort chosen.  There is also a marginally
significant negative coefficient on the MW treatment dummy in specification (4), where we
discard ESL wages less than 5, for better comparability with the MW treatment.  As before,
there is no significant difference across treatments in the relationship between effort and wage.
Overall effort is seen to be significantly lower in the MW treatment, when we compare effort in
response to wages of 5 or more.
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5. DISCUSSION
Let us consider the data in the light of our hypotheses. Wage offers are similar in the ESL
and ESF treatments, in contrast to HAi, although the effective wage paid is indeed a bit higher in
the tighter labor market.  We can easily reject part (ii) of the null hypothesis in favor of the
alternative HAii; effort levels are increasing in wages.  These results are entirely consistent with
previous gift-exchange studies.
We wish to specially highlight the findings pertaining to our third alternative hypothesis.
Recall that some social-preference models claim that financial sacrifice is motivated only by
distributional concerns, so that menu dependence is irrelevant.  In this case, there should be no
difference across treatments in the effort/wage relationship, since the effort chosen at a particular
wage will be the same regardless of the path leading to the choice.  On the other hand, the formal
kindness-based models of reciprocity predict that if intermediate wages are perceived as less kind
in the ESF or MW treatments than in the ESL treatment, there will be less sacrifice at these
wages in the non-ESL treatments.
Imposing a minimum wage does appear to substantially reduce the effort level for
intermediate wages.  However, Table 1 shows that this also has the effect of reducing effort for
even the highest wages.  Overall, the average effort chosen in the ESL treatment is about 50%
higher than in the MW treatment, and the average effort/wage ratio is marginally significantly
lower (Table 4, last line) in the MW treatment than in the ESL treatment, even with the few
session-level observations available.  
While there appears to be lower effort in the MW treatment, the pattern of worker
responsiveness is not consistent with the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (forthcoming) model.  To
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see this, recall that the perceived kindness of a wage depends on the feasible range; a wage of 5 is
as unkind as possible in the MW treatment, but neither kind nor unkind in the ESL treatment
(since 5 is the average of the [0,10] wage range).  If financial sacrifice here is inspired by such
kindness considerations, there should be lower effort at intermediate wages in the MW treatment.
But since the model presumes that a wage of 10 is equally kind in all cases, there should be a
greater difference in the MW treatment in effort at intermediate vs. high wages than in the ESL
treatment. This should be reflected in regressions on effort against wages in this range.
However, specification (4) in Table 5b shows that while the coefficient for the intercept
term is significant (p = 0.039, for the one-tailed test appropriate for the ex ante prediction), the
coefficient for the interaction term is not at all close to being statistically significant.23  Thus, the
lower overall effort in the MW treatment (specification (6) in Table 5b shows strong significance
for the MW dummy) is a feature for the full wage range.  This does indicate that some form of
menu dependence is present, although not the form described in the range-based kindness models.
For the ESF vs. ESL comparison, it is perhaps surprising that the chosen wages do not
differ dramatically across treatments. Since a similar pattern of wage offers across treatments
might cause workers (in a between-subjects comparison) to feel the same way about a particular
wage, it is possible that perceived kindness does not differ much across treatments. If the degree
of perceived kindness of a wage does not differ across the ESF and ESL treatments, we should
not expect the patterns of worker responsiveness to differ.  Nevertheless, accepted wage levels
are indeed moderately higher in the ESF treatment than in the ESL treatment (8.36 vs. 7.45).
                                                
23 The coefficient on the interaction term is also far from significant in the regression using the full ESF wage
range, specification (3) in Table 5b.
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Specification (1) in Table 5a shows that this difference is marginally significant (Z = 1.42, p =
0.078, one-tailed test).
None of the strict nonparametric tests in Table 4 show any differences between the ESF
and ESL treatments.  In addition, the regressions in specifications (2) and (3) of Table 5a show
few differences between the ESL and ESF treatments. The ESF dummy is not significantly
different than 0.  While the coefficient for the ESF wage-interaction term is not significantly
different than 0, it is slightly negative. This is the sign predicted by the Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (forthcoming) model given a more limited ‘feasible’ wage range (as defined by
positive wages with a reasonable chance of being profitable) than in the ESF treatment.24  
In any event, the ESF vs. ESL comparison does not suggest a kindness-based difference in
responsiveness.  However, since the pattern of wages is not strongly divergent and perceived
kindness may not differ across treatments, we are reluctant to conclude that the observed
difference indicates a rejection of the model.  It may also be a bit unrealistic to expect to identify
the requisite slope effect with the data at hand.  In a general sense, perhaps the observed behavior
is consistent with a broader notion of kindness, since many people might well consider lowering
wages when there are excess workers to be a form of exploitation.25
In any case, the combined data from our three treatments suggests that effort responses
reflect distributional preferences more than kindness-based positive reciprocity as formulated.
                                                
24 If a worker suspects that the motivation behind a wage is to respond strategically to competitive pressure, he
might be inclined to be less generous in return, making low positive wages ‘not feasible’.  Using the data in Table
1, it is easy to calculate that, on average, any positive wage below 5 loses money in the ESF treatment, while every
positive wage except 4 is profitable in the ESL treatment.  Choosing the minimum wage roughly breaks even in the
MW treatment.
25 Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Bewley (1999) find that personnel managers indicate that firms are reluctant to
cut wages when there is an excess supply of workers, fearing that workers will perceive such cuts as unfair and
hostile.
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Formal models of social preferences that do not include positive reciprocity, such as Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002), can explain gift
exchange as an equilibrium phenomenon and, in general terms, fit together well with our data.
However, perhaps there is something in our data that suggests the need to go beyond models of
the type just mentioned, as behavior seems menu-dependent in at least the MW treatment.
The reduction in effort in the MW treatment is fairly uniform over the wage range, so that
it is worker generosity (rather than a response to perceived kindness) that is impacted.  While not
predicted by any of the leading models of social preferences, the reductions in effort and in the
proportion of top wages paid in the MW treatment are consistent with the responsibility-
alleviation in Charness (2000). This idea says that people will act in a more generous (or honest)
manner when the full weight of responsibility for an outcome rests upon their own shoulders.
Being ‘forced to be generous’ by the presence of a minimum wage means that workers are not as
responsive to the wages offered; in addition, firms themselves are reluctant to offer top wages
under these circumstances.  On the other hand, changing the state of competition to an excess
supply of firms does not have much effect on either worker or firm behavior.
On further reflection it appears that conceiving of behavior in gift exchange-markets
fundamentally in terms of the rewarding of perceived kindness may lead to a bit of a paradox.
Kindness-based positive reciprocity implies that workers expend effort to reward wage levels
that they perceive to be kind.  But to appear truly kind, a wage should surely be above the one
that yields the highest profits for firms.  In our data this is actually not possible, since the ex post
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profit-maximizing wage is 10 in all treatments.26  More generally, however, if certain wage levels
that are perceived as kind are sufficiently reciprocated, then they may themselves become the
profit-maximizing ones.  This reflection is in line with our data being roughly consistent with
models that do not incorporate this kind of positive reciprocity.
The results from our single-period sessions are similar in spirit to those in the ESL and
ESF treatments, demonstrating that repeated interaction is not required for gift exchange.
However, the reduced wage and effort levels, as well as the decay seen in the ESL and ESF
sessions, suggest that behavior may have been influenced by some type of strategic
consideration, perhaps such as group reputation-building.27  Nevertheless, the average firm
income in period 10 is still substantially larger than the equilibrium prediction, in both
treatments.
6. CONCLUSION
One principal finding is that in our data the differences between our ESL and ESF
treatments are minor, in that whether firms or workers are on the long or short side of the market
generally does not have a major impact on their behavior.  The intuitive notion that being on the
long or short side of the market will affect people’s disposition towards others is not supported
by our data.
As discussed in detail in section 4, we find very considerable deviations from the standard
prediction.  Our results exhibit a clear pattern of reciprocal actions, as in previous work on gift
                                                
26 Of course, this does not address the question of why a wage of 10 is expected (ex post) to maximize firm income.
27 Charness, Frechette, and Kagel (forthcoming) also observe substantial decay in gift exchange in the last periods of
their experimental session.
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exchange.  We also find that subjects are able to attain considerable cooperative gains.  Thus, the
absence of an ESL-ESF treatment effect is not the result of laboratory behavior conforming to the
standard game-theoretic prediction.
The other main result is the significant impact of imposing a minimum wage.  Although
the positive relationship between wage and effort is the same when a minimum wage is imposed
as when it isn’t, the intervention has a negative effect on effort provision (productivity). We feel
that this result is not only interesting as an instance of menu dependence, but also has some
policy relevance.  The question is how much credence can be given to our result in this respect.  
One possibility is that our experiments have just picked up a rather short-term emotional
response to the minimum wage.  If so, perhaps such an effect might just disappear after an initial
period (as one’s sense of entitlement adjusts) and, hence, would probably not be registered by
appropriate field data.  One may even speculate that experiments using the strategy-elicitation
procedure – which tends to evoke more thoughtful behavior – would not find the minimum wage
effect.  However, it would be very hard to actually check the above possibility with field data
due to the multitude of intervening factors.
Our evidence can be put into perspective by relating it to the cited evidence favoring the
notion that non-outcome information influences behavior.  A provisional assessment of this
evidence points to several patterns: First, non-outcome information tends to be more relevant
when it very directly points to others’ personal responsibility, as in the cases analyzed by
Charness (forthcoming) and Brandts and Charness (2003).  Second, perhaps due to a form of self-
serving bias, people may react more strongly to perceived negative intentions (which may play
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no role in our context) than to perceived positive intentions.28 Third – and perhaps most
importantly – motivation and behavior cannot always be separated from issues of cognition and
perception. Some menu alternations may just be naturally more salient and jump more readily to
people’s eye than others. The interplay of cognition and motivation is rather unexplored terrain
at this point, but may actually be of considerable importance for understanding social and
economic life.  We feel that empirical data – among it experimental data like ours – will be an
essential input in this regard.
On the basis of our interpretation of this previous evidence, the modest treatment effects
we found in this paper appear to make sense.  The attribution of disposition on the basis of the
type of market-balance can only be based on a rather indirect channel, while the presence of a
minimum wage is rather paramount in the minds of the workers.  With competitive bidding, the
attribution of responsibility is muted, potentially explaining why the direction of market
imbalance does not seem to be a strong force in our data.  In contrast, the way a minimum wage
restricts firms’ choice set is rather transparent.  Our results suggest that models of
interdependent preferences may not need to take into account the effects of market imbalance on
motivation, but that the issue of responsibility and generosity perhaps should be considered.
                                                
28 See Offerman (2002).
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Table 1 - Average Effort at each Wage, by Multi-period Treatment
Wage ESF ESL MW
0 0.00 (18) 0.00  (41) ---
1 0.00   (3) 0.33    (3) ---
2 ---     (0) 0.80    (5) ---
3 0.00   (1) 0.67    (6) ---
4 0.50   (4) 0.67    (9) ---
5 1.45  (20) 2.20   (15) 1.03   (37)
6 1.38  (16) 2.90   (10) 1.61   (38)
7 1.64  (14) 2.71   (14) 2.58   (69)
8 2.70  (30) 4.12   (25) 2.86   (57)
9 4.91  (22) 4.64   (36) 3.13   (39)
10 5.96 (192) 5.40 (156) 3.75   (80)
Average effort 4.40 (320) 3.84 (320) 2.69 (320)
Average wage 8.36 (320) 7.45 (320) 7.82 (320)
Agg. effort/wage .527 .515 .345
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Table 2a - Average Wages and Effort in Single-period Sessions
Session S-1
(9)
Session S-2
(9)
Session S-3
(7)
Session S-4
(8)
Overall
(33)
Average
wage 6.44 5.11 5.00 3.25 4.85
Average
effort 4.33 2.67 1.29 1.00 2.42
The numbers of observations are in parentheses.
Table 2b – Distribution of Single-period Session Wages
Wage levels 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
# of
observations
8 2 1 1 3 7 0 1 0 1 9
Average
effort levels
1.5 0 2 4 1.3 3.1 - 0 - 6 3.8
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Table 3- Average Wage and Effort, by Session
ESF
1
ESF
2
ESF
3
ESF
4
ESL
1
ESL
2
ESL
3
ESL
4
MW
1
MW
2
MW
3
MW
4
Avg. effort,
wages 0-4 - 0.00 0.00 0.22 1.14 0.00 0.12 0.22 - - - -
Avg. effort,
wages 5-8 - 1.77 1.56 2.64 5.62 3.17 1.46 2.59 3.07 1.45 1.77 2.43
Avg. effort,
wages 9-10 8.44 3.19 3.72 5.65 6.07 5.17 5.52 2.68 4.78 3.74 2.74 2.89
Avg. wage.
session 9.66
10.0
5.91
7.54
6.24
7.91
7.57
7.98
8.82 8.46 7.59 4.92 7.54 8.04 7.55 8.16
Avg. effort,
session 8.44 2.61 2.36 4.21 5.56 4.46 3.81 1.55 3.62 2.54 2.00 2.56
Aggregate
effort/wage
ratio
.844 .346 .299 .528 .630 .527 .502 .315 .481 .316 .265 .323
In the ESF sessions, average accepted wages are shown in italics, below the average wage offers.
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Table 4- Permutation Tests on Session-level Data
Measure Probability,
ESF vs. ESL
Probability,
MW vs. ESL
Average wage offered 0.914 (0.457) 0.886 (0.443)
Average wage accepted 0.514 (0.257) 0.886 (0.443)
Average effort 0.800  (0.600) 0.286  (0.143)
Average effort, wage 5-8 0.686  (0.657) 0.343  (0.171)
Average effort, wage 9-10 0.286  (0.571) 0.200 (0.100)
Aggregate effort/wage ratio 0.829  (0.586) 0.114  (0.057)
Probabilities in parentheses reflect one-tailed tests; all others reflect two-tailed tests
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Table 5a - Random-efforts Ordered Probit Regressions, ESL vs. ESF
Dependent VariableIndependent
variables Wage
(1)
Effort
(2)
Effort*
(3)
Effort
(4)
ESF .350
(1.42)
.346
(0.65)
.329
(0.94)
.614
(2.91)
Wage - .384
(10.4)
.375
(6.21)
-
ESF*Wage - -.030
(-0.52)
-.063
(-0.84)
-
Period 1 -1.297
(-5.38)
.434
(1.83)
.198
(0.77)
-.473
(-2.21)
Period 2 -.852
(-3.60)
.064
(0.28)
.043
(0.18)
-.079
(-0.37)
Period 3 -.627
(-2.58)
.440
(1.96)
.369
(1.58)
.152
(0.70)
Period 4 -.736
(-3.02)
.375
(1.63)
.402
(1.70)
.105
(0.48)
Period 5 -.355
(-1.42)
.139
(0.61)
.086
(0.37)
.099
(0.45)
Period 7 -.444
(-1.80)
.077
(0.34)
.032
(0.14)
-.065
(-0.30)
Period 8 -.445
(-1.81)
-.382
(-1.66)
-.432
(-1.85)
-.353
(-1.58)
Period 9 -.319
(-1.28)
-.986
(-4.21)
-1.015
(-4.28)
-.842
(-3.76)
Period 10 -1.805
(-7.40)
-1.502
(-5.29)
-1.551
 (-5.35)
-1.774
(-6.91)
N 632 640 550 640
LL -897 -911 -869 -1003
Z-statistics in parentheses; ESF = 1 for excess-firm data and ESF = 0 otherwise.
Specifications marked by (*) consider only data from wages greater than 4.
Bold indicates significance at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
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Table 5b - Random-effects Ordered Probit Regressions, ESL vs. MW
Dependent VariableIndependent
variables Wage
(1)
Wage*
(2)
Effort
(3)
Effort*
(4)
Effort
(5)
Effort*
(6)
MW -.352
(-1.56)
-1.166
(-5.97)
-.725
(-1.21)
-.714
(-1.76)
-.355
(-1.22)
-.773
(-2.61)
Wage - - .408
(10.7)
.382
(6.29)
- -
MW*Wage - - .043
(0.75)
.055
(0.74)
- -
Period 1 -1.042
(-5.15)
-1.619
(-7.20)
.188
(0.80)
-0.54
(-0.21)
-.659
(-3.09)
-.905
(-3.92)
Period 2 -.490
(-2.49)
-.914
(-4.34)
-.191
(-0.85)
-.202
(-0.88)
-.354
(-1.67)
-.599
(-2.71)
Period 3 -.635
(-3.19)
-.836
(-3.79)
.019
(0.08)
-109
(-0.45)
-.419
(-1.94)
-.542
(-2.35)
Period 4 -.679
(-3.42)
-.729
(-3.35)
.031
(0.13)
-.024
(0.10)
-.352
(-1.64)
-.331
(-1.45)
Period 5 -.070
(-0.34)
-.228
(-1.04)
.146
(0.66)
.089
(0.40)
-.124
(0.59)
-.030
(-0.14)
Period 7 .296
(1.43)
.051
(0.23)
-.200
(-0.91)
-.279
(-1.27)
.052
(0.25)
-.226
(-1.03)
Period 8 .081
(0.40)
-.064
(-0.29)
-.254
(-1.12)
-.294
(-1.27)
-.066
(-0.31)
-.265
(-1.18)
Period 9 .525
(2.46)
.408
(1.79)
-.473
(-2.13)
-.485
(-2.14)
-.152
(-0.72)
-.322
(-1.45)
Period 10 -.375
(-1.85)
.029
(0.13)
-1.052
(-4.34)
-1.093
(-4.39)
-.927
(-4.09)
-.972
(-4.01)
N 640 572 640 576 640 576
LL -1072 -789 -998 -962 -1107 -1010
Z-statistics in parentheses. MW = 1 for minimum-wage data and MW = 0 otherwise.
Specifications marked by (*) consider only data from wages greater than 4.
Bold indicates significance at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
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Figure II
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Figure IV: Average Wages over Time
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Figure V: Average Effort over Time
0
2
4
6
8
10
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9 Period 10
E
ff
or
t
ESL ESF MW
